What is Philosophy?

What is Philosophy? 

    I’d argue that the general public lacks knowledge as to what philosophy actually is, much less what it looks like in application. Because of this, there are consequences, including detrimental moral consequences for individuals, and the functioning society at large. But also because of this, philosophy is often under-appreciated. And by consequence, those of us who specialize in it often become relegated to “bullshit majors,” or people who went to college and their field of study’s only application in the socio-political sphere (or in the U.S.: this means the “job market”) is “flipping burgers,”—as I overheard my father in a conversation say to a crowd of his conservative friends, in response to the following question, “but, what is he [Dillon] going to do with it [his philosophy major]?” Of course, his joke landed with his tribe, and invoked some laughter—at my expense.

As one discovers this ignorance (or lack of knowledge or understanding) of philosophy within the general public (including among religionists), accompanied with it, we often see an individual and sociological arrogance when it comes to viewing or dealing with philosophy or philosophers and/or those of us who specialize in it (e.g. Theologians, etc.). Perhaps this is the Dunning-Kruger effect at play, as people overestimate their competence, their understanding, and their overall skillset in philosophy, and therefore (unintentionally) expose that overestimation in their own articulations or verbage, which is put on display as a type of arrogance, which comes off that way obviously, but also to us, as a type of insecurity.

At least part of the reason this occurs, is because there is a common definition of philosophy and also a common cluster of understandings of “philosophy,” (whether correct or not) and those definitions/understandings usually take the form of what I will place into three categories: 1.) Self-help, or 2.) A general way of doing things (but often very superficial way of doing things in the grand scheme of the word) related to a particular task, like “cooking.” (This actually fits one of Oxford’s philosophy definitions as: “a theory or attitude held by a person or organization that acts as a guiding principle for behavior.”) Or there is—not that this is an actual definition, but it is sometimes a lay-misunderstanding of it—3.) conspiracies or conspiracy theory. 

    We all know what “1.) Self-help” is. Self-help “philosophy” makes its way into the social-political sphere via ideological and consumeristic trends, books and other caveats of culture, (YouTube videos, podcasts, etc.) and can often come in mass adoption, and they come in different forms: health, finance, fads, “leaders,” (Joe Rogan, Jordan Peterson, etc.), and can even take the form of “spiritual” or “enlightened ones,” and they typically are responding to a certain public need. They often give feel-good attitude adjustments, and may even claim they are “philosophy” or “critical thinkers” fitting our category “2.) A general way of doing things…etc..” which is actually an accurate common definition/understanding that I demarcated—but it can be often posited or sold as the philosophy that I’m talking about. However, contrary to philosophy as a discipline, these “philosophies” often contain very un-comprehensive ideas, perhaps about positivity, or how to get through adversity from an uncritical and/or limited perspective, or maybe even provide you with “the simple art of not giving a f*ck” in life, (pun-intended). Perhaps you might even call these self-help books/ideas/sayings/trends/ways of thinking, “life-coaching” approaches within capitalist America—and interestingly, they are often intimately connected to America’s capitalism (wink, wink).

    Our third understanding of “philosophy” we commonly find amongst the lay public, even though it fits no proper definition of philosophy that I’m aware of, is “3.) conspiracies or conspiracy theory,” and unfortunately, if anyone has lived in the United States in the last almost 10 years, we’ve all had uncomfortable doses of these, and if you are like me, probably quite enough of that, perhaps enough for a lifetime. As a matter of fact, even today, I couldn’t escape it. Why? Because I clicked one of my social media apps where it took me to a home feed full of conspiracy theories that usually take the form of conservative memes from the accounts of several people that have been connected to me at one point or another in my life. (Conspiracy and conspiracy theories are not limited to conservatives, but that seems to be their most salient manifestations, as Qanon found its home in right-wing politics, not left-wing of modern day). 

    However, what I really want to focus on, is our second categorization. It is, “2.) A general way of doing things (but often superficial way of doing things) related to a particular task, like ‘cooking.’” I would say, that this is probably the most common definitional understanding of philosophy, even if it has some overlap with our 1.) demarcation, and on occasion our 3.) demarcation. Though, when people talk about their “philosophy on cooking,” (or philosophy of/on whatever) this often can actually describe a subjective psychological preference, opposed to an actual philosophy, or if anything rudimentarily-philosophical about it occurs, perhaps it is that at minimum, it provides vague rules or principles (likely not comprehensive rules either). An example: “My philosophy is that recipe X doesn’t need any sugar, and that instead you should use honey.” This can be, strictly psychological habit, and/or subjective opinion or preference even, concerning this loose-use of ‘my philosophy on __X___’ where, when this person was asked for reasons “why,” the person responded, “it’s just my way of making X” or perhaps a hyperbolic-sentimental statement like, “it’s the only way to make Grandma’s special X.” What do both of those mean? More than likely the first means something to the nature of “it’s just how I like to do it.” Perhaps there are other ways, but that person just does that way. The latter, might even have some sort of traditional ritual to it, “Grandma’s special X is always made this way, so we will honor it.” Well is it though? (Grandma always substituted different ingredients when she was out of something; she was innovative!) So, no… This was obviously hypothetical, but perhaps you know people that emulate this usage, I know that I do, and have observed it often.

Is this often the case though, regarding definition 2.)’s usage of the word “philosophy?”—that it is usually coming from a psychological state rather than a well-founded or reasoned state? It’s difficult to answer that because the question is loaded. One might say, that even “well-founded reasons” are “psychological.” Okay, if not totally, at least in large part;  fair. But that’s a different interpretation of psychological, and not what I was asking. By “psychological” I was meaning: the opposite of what the discipline of philosophy is, meaning the absence of critical thinking, the absence of well-founded reasoning, the absence of systematized, organized, and well-tested thought, the absence of choices made where optimality or deliberate purpose is a priority, and instead in its place, there is the lack of the former. Perhaps there is habitual behavior in a particular way with no reasoned purpose other than sentiment (e.g. straying from my philosophy that Grandma’s special X is the best X), or perhaps, one’s philosophy even taps into one’s disposition (another example: e.g. ‘my philosophy on walking the dog’)? But back to the question: is 2.) often or usually coming from a psychological state rather than a place of reason? My guess, in the former explicit scenarios, that it is probably more psychological than ‘well founded and reasoned’ philosophy. More information is needed. That question is curious for psychological/sociological purposes if one were to see how statistically salient that phenomenon is, but it’s irrelevant for my purposes.

    But, let’s say someone asserts that as a true sociological/psychological statement of the use of philosophy’s 2.) definition. (I’m not asserting that by the way.) Even if we allow the assertion (as we don’t know enough information to put that assertion to the test), we can hypothetically think of particular exceptions to that assertion based on some of the examples I gave. (E.g. the “cooking” philosophy example) An exception to that assertion would be if there is a person who uses philosophy’s 2.) in the context where there is A.) some sort of *actual* reasoning here that suggests the substitution of honey fundamentally changes the outcome of recipe X, by changing the chemical compound of the cooking process since honey is actually more acidic than sugar. Or B.), if there are actual empirical reasons buried somewhere [exactly like exception A.) or for similar past empirical reasons (i.e. “similar” meaning: out of honey and sugar, one is sweeter, so a decision is made from that)], in the unconscious or subconsciousness of the person, and the lived experiences of the person’s past are somehow driving the present moment by psychological habit, for why they are substituting sugar for honey while cooking food X. This is also what I’m talking about as psychological usage of 2.). Even here, after observing this, you catch them in that moment and ask them “why,” they can’t articulate it or justify why, they don’t seem to know. I would consider exception B.) to be a psychological usage in it’s momentary use, but would be backed by logical reasons at one point in their past history, which had by then in that moment become habit, or “custom” as David Hume would say, and part of unconscious or subconscious psychological activity. (Not to say that Jungian “unconscious” is Humean terminology, that would be anachronistic.) Philosophers and Psychologists agree that most of our day-to-day human behavior is not consciously overriding, and that we sort of coast on a sort of defaulted-conscious-but-less-conscious programming. Nevertheless, although A.) is closer to philosophy, neither one of these exceptions are examples of what philosophy as a discipline really is. I doubt we would say either are “doing philosophy.”

    But let’s hear from someone else on the issue. To echo my thoughts, this sounds closely related to what the philosopher Douglas J. Soccio talks about when he discusses what philosophy is not—even if he doesn’t go into it in the depth that I have gone. Soccio writes historically about the word philosophy in his textbook, The Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy. He writes, “The word philosophy comes from the Greek roots meaning ‘the love of wisdom.’ The earliest philosophers were considered wise men and women, or sages, because they devoted themselves to asking ‘big questions’: What is the meaning of life? Where did everything come from? What is the nature of reality?” (Soccio, 2) Soccio continues, 

For a long time, most philosophers were wisdom-seeking amateurs. That is, philosophy was a way of living for them, not a way of making a living. (The original meaning of amateur is one who is motivated by love rather than by profit.) […] We use the term philosophy in a similar sense when we think of a person’s basic philosophy as the code of values and beliefs by which someone lives. Sometimes we talk about Abby’s philosophy of cooking or Mikey’s philosophy of betting on the horses. In such instances, we are thinking of philosophy as involving general principles or guidelines. Technically, that’s known as having a philosophy; it is not the same thing as being a philosopher. (2)

A primary thing that I have done differently is take an epistemological/psychological dive into what “principles” and “guidelines” are when people often use them and in particular, with respect to our earlier philosophy definition/understanding 2.). Thus, “guidelines” might mean a person who is operating out of psychological habit when they use the term “philosophy” although that’s not happening in every case, and I’m not equipped to make that claim, I’m simply acknowledging its existence. I think also sometimes, people are operating out of conscious behavior when they talk about their “philosophy of throwing horse shoes” (philosophy of whatever), and perhaps there is some sort of vague principles, rules, or guidelines, guiding them. At the end of the day what matters, is this is not what philosophy is, or at least in the sense that I mean.

    I’m not being elitist about philosophy either, these understandings are just not what the discipline is about. On the other hand, I also don’t think that you have to be a philosophy professor to speak on philosophy, or to study it, or for it to put one on the path to meaning. The philosopher that I teach my students with (since he wrote their textbook), as I mentioned before, Douglas J. Soccio states, “You don’t have to be a philosopher to ask philosophical questions; you just have to be a naturally curious and thoughtful person. Here’s a sampling of the kinds of questions philosophers study:

• Does God Exist?
• What is the meaning of life?
• Why do innocent people suffer?
• Is everything a matter of opinion?
• Are all people really equal, and if so, in what sense?
• What is the best form of government? 
• Is it better to try to make the majority happy at the expense of a few or make a few happy at the expense of many?
• How are minds connected to bodies?
• Is there one standard of right and wrong for everyone, or are moral standards relative?
• Is beauty in the eye of the beholder?
• Does might make right?
• Is objectivity possible? Desirable?” (Soccio, 2)

Of course this list is not exhaustive of the questions of the field of study, but this gives readers an idea of some of the questions that have taken place in the history of philosophy over the years, or even questions that still hold relevance and/or significance within the field today. And when we are actually talking about the field of philosophy, one of the things that I tell my students often, is that there is a difference between sounding philosophical, and actually doing something philosophical. I think this is where (in what actual philosophers do) we are going to break from all of the common understandings/definitions of “philosophy.” To make this point, I often utilize Soccio to do this as well, when he instructs in his book to, 

distinguish between saying philosophical-sounding things and actually philosophizing. Perhaps the chief difference between just talking about philosophical ideas and actually philosophizing about them involves the degree or rigor and discipline you apply to your reflections. (3)

I think this is true, insofar as the right questions have been asked to begin with. But certain questions might not actually be philosophical, and might call for a sociological count, like a question I posed earlier. Nevertheless, once the right questions are being asked, I think what Soccio stated above, is a good starting point. He continues, 

We can say, then, that philosophy consists of careful reasoning about certain kinds of issues. Philosophical thinking includes careful assessment of terms, evaluation of logical reasoning, willingness to make refined distinctions, and so forth. Philosophers are especially interested in the arguments (reasons) offered to support our ideas. (Soccio, 3 italicized emphasis added)

This part here eliminates our category 3.), what I demarcated as a lay/common understanding of “philosophy” which was “conspiracy or conspiracy theories.” Why? Because conspiracy theorists lack ‘careful reasoning,’  ‘careful assessment of terms,’ (as a matter of fact conspiracy theorists often conflate terms and use them ambiguously and conveniently for argument). Conspiracy theorists also lack logical frameworks, and often any ‘evaluation of logical reasoning,’ (they often abandon logic and replace with fallacies) and they certainly lack the “willingness” to retract in their former assertion(s) and “make refined distinctions” especially since with conspiracy and conspiracy theorists, a conclusion is already drawn, and data is sifted through to fit the pre-existing narrative. (And at this point all of the common definitional/understandings of philosophy have been contradicted when it comes to philosophy as a discipline, field or practice). However, before I move forward with philosophy as a discipline I want to stay honed in on conspiracy or conspiracy theory for a moment, and take you on a brief excursion.

A Tangential Excursion and Justification of Some “Conspiracy”as having Legitimate Philosophical Roots:

    To briefly abandon our distinction of philosophy, though the following is connected. There is actually an exception where conspiracy or conspiracy theory can take philosophical roots in truth, or can be, more explicitly the truth itself. I find that to be rare in the days of right-wing conspiracy, Qanon, and anti-evidence paradigms and psychological-clinging. However, in the cases where this happens, it happens as a byproduct of subjugation and imperial power—a particular dynamic at play upon oppressed people(s). I’ll provide a brief historical example of such. Have you ever heard of “the War on Drugs”?—it is a great example of this. Black people, a historically subjugated and oppressed people in the United States (and an oppressed people of world at large) quickly began to view ‘the War on Drugs’ differently than it was being promoted—primarily, as a tool of Black oppression to keep them subjugated and degraded and in their ‘rightful’ places. Michelle Alexander, writes in some depth over this on pages 5 and 6 of her book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, (but the whole book is about this more generally), so I’ll refrain from sharing all the details. Yet, in this particular case, the “objective” epistemic forces worked against people of color, and for domination and deceit, instead of truth. Alexander writes, 

The timing of the crack crisis helped to fuel conspiracy theories and general speculation in poor black communities that the War on Drugs was part of a genocidal plan by the government to destroy black people in the United States. From the outset, stories circulated on the street that crack and other drugs were being brought into black neighborhoods by the CIA. Eventually even the Urban League came to take the claims of genocide seriously. In its 1990 report “The State of Black America,” it stated: “There is at least one concept that must be recognized if one is to see the pervasive and insidious nature of the drug problem for the African American community. Though difficult to accept, that is the concept of genocide.” While the conspiracy theories were initially dismissed as far-fetched, if not downright loony, the word on the street turned out to be right, at least to a point. The CIA admitted in 1998 that guerrilla armies it actively supported in Nicaragua were smuggling illegal drugs into the United States—drugs that were making their way onto the streets of inner-city black neighborhoods in the form of crack cocaine. The CIA also admitted that, in the midst of the War on Drugs, it blocked law enforcement efforts to investigate illegal drug networks that were helping to fund its covert war in Nicaragua. […] It bears emphasis that the CIA never admitted (nor has any evidence been revealed to support the claim) that it intentionally sought the destruction of the black community by allowing illegal drugs to be smuggled into the United States. Nonetheless, conspiracy theorists [by the black community over this] surely must be forgiven for their bold accusation of genocide, in light of the devastation wrought by crack cocaine and the drug war, and the odd coincidence that an illegal drug crisis suddenly appeared in the black community after—not before—a drug war had been declared.” (Alexander, 5-6) 

Other examples of how this type of consciousness, or philosophical consciousness can be built through “conspiracy theory” as labeled by the group in power, (though if rooted in existential subjective experience, it really isn’t conspiracy) can be found in other sources too. See James Cone’s, Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare? Or perhaps see, Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana’s, Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance for more on this. Another great source is Patricia Collin’s Black Feminist Thought. It’s not a necessary condition that it must be a racial matter, it could be a class matter as well. Much more can be investigated on this issue, but from this exception or objection, my goal was to introduce this nuanced possibility, but from here, I digress. Let us get back to our discussion of what philosophy really is.

Continuing The Discipline of Philosophy:

    Coming back to philosophy, Soccio writes, “Philosophical issues concern ultimate values, general principles, the nature of reality, knowledge, justice, happiness, truth, God, beauty, and morality. Philosophy addresses questions that other subjects do not address at all, and it addresses them in a more thorough way.” (Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom, 3) I agree with this claim, not just because I’m a philosopher, but historically, I left other fields of study, because they lacked what philosophy had to offer. And back to my non-elitist views about the quality of philosophy, Soccio seems to once more echo my sentiments. Accordingly, 

That’s not to say, however, that we can tell whether or not a person is a philosopher just by his or her job description. Physicists, psychologists, physicians, literary critics, artists, poets, novelists, soldiers, housewives—all sorts of folks—engage in philosophical reflection without necessarily being labeled as philosophers. The quality of philosophical reasoning should concern us most, rather than the label of “philosopher.” (3)

I agree with Soccio here, with an added qualification. All sorts of folks can hypothetically engage in philosophical reflection from all sorts of varying professions, but 1.) some people are naturally better at it than others, and 2.) because we live in a predatory capitalist society, quality philosophizing, and quality reading (including quality reading of the quantity of significant philosophers that have lived throughout the history of the planet) will be hard to do in an economy where “78% of Americans are living paycheck to paycheck.” (Bartdorf and Benninger, Living Pay Check To Pay Check, Forbes.com) In other words, when one’s energy is required to feed oneself, and one’s family, and pay bills, and one can barely maintain this cycle all year long, (and often for years) the non-professional pursuer of philosophy (and my meaning here for “professional:” in our contemporary times, the one who commits oneself to philosophy as a career-path, or commits oneself to something closely related, Theology, Moral Psychology, Religious Studies, etc.) in all statistical likelihood, will not be up to par with “professional” philosophy. I hate that, but given our current economic predicament, that is just the reality we live in. (There are things that could be done to change that—outside of the need of redrafting the economic system—like placing philosophy in K-12). Despite this trend, there are exceptions to this. One might be a likely candidate, if a person comes from great wealth, and they are able to stay up to par with philosophy, and expend the time, energy and commitment necessary to maintain philosophical development and contribute to the field—because they aren’t occupied with survival or moral obligation to their family. But that’s statistically probably extremely rare. And if someone comes from that kind of wealth, in all likelihood, they’ll probably have better things to do than read philosophy (at least from their perspective). Other professions like “physicians” would probably make enough to be significantly trained in philosophy, (if they can have downtime away from their patients) for example, their work overlaps with biomedical ethics at times. On the other hand, not all physicians are philosophical enough to be labeled “philosophers,” and some are not that philosophical at all, etc., and so forth. You get the idea. 

    Moving on; thus, for Soccio, Philosophy is more than an academic practice, as we can infer from the previous. Also, the subfields of philosophy that he is about to show us can be traced back and found even in the ancient peoples, although, these fields are all still relevant in philosophy today. He writes, “In practice, philosophy consists of the systematic, comprehensive study of certain questions that center on meaning, interpretation, evaluation, and logical or rational consistency.” (4) Here are the major categories as Soccio defines them:

-Metaphysics encompasses the study of what is sometimes termed “ultimate reality.” As such, metaphysics raises questions about reality that go beyond sense experience, beyond ordinary science. Metaphysical questions involve free will, the mind-body relationship, supernatural existence, personal immortality, and the nature of being. Some philosophers […] question the very possibility of a reality beyond human experience, while others […] base their philosophies on metaphysical notions.

-Epistemology, from the Greek for “knowledge,” is the branch of philosophy that asks questions about knowledge, its nature and origins, and whether it is even possible. Epistemological question involve standards of evidence, truth, belief, sources of knowledge, gradations of knowledge, memory, and perception. Epistemological issues cut across all other branches of philosophy. 

-Ethics, from the Greek word ethos, encompasses the study of moral problems, practical reasoning, right and wrong, good and bad, virtues and vices, character, moral duty, and related issues involving the nature, origins, and scope of moral values. Today, it is not uncommon for ethicists to specialize in medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, academic ethics, issues of ethnicity and gender, and the nature of the good life. Ethical issues include benevolence, truth-telling, relativism, and universality. 

-Social and political philosophy are concerned with the nature and origins of the state (government), sovereignty, the exercise of power, the effects of social institutions on individuals, ethnicity, gender, social status, and the strengths and weaknesses of different types of societies. (4)

Even though these can be found within the history of ancient philosophy in piecemeal fashion here and there, and even though these fields are still relevant today, this isn’t too say that there aren’t philosophers who wholly or largely reject certain subfields. For example, a famous philosopher of science, Rudolph Carnap wholly rejected metaphysics. (Unfortunately, the damage he caused still infects public epistemic processes today). Other philosophers such as Philosophers of Religion, or Theologians may actually have their focus primarily in Metaphysics. Philosophers have a lot that they disagree on, but this isn’t to say that there isn’t consensus on topics. There are also many others that Soccio did not mention, or gave lesser attention to. For example, one that is a significant part of my work is called Philosophy of Race, but this bleeds into Ethics, Epistemology, and Socio-Political Philosophy—and at times when dealing with religions or cosmology of races, it will also include Metaphysics, Ontology, and Theology. However, he does give mention to a few other significant subfields within philosophy. Soccio provides the following list, but I’ve laid it out a little differently than he has it in the text:

-Logic: the study of rules or correct reasoning

-Axiology: the study of values

-Aesthetics: the study of perceptions, feelings, judgements, and ideas associated with the appreciation of beauty, art, and objects in general

-Ontology: the study of being and what it means to “Exist.” (Soccio, 4)

Another subfield that is popular and often found in most universities today is Eastern Philosophy. It would cross over with (to mention some of the fields that have been acknowledged here) Metaphysics, Ontology, Cosmology/Theology mostly, and one that has not been mentioned Psychology. (Psychology is peculiar to mention because it is its own field now, but it didn’t start out that way, philosophy birthed it. Many Psychologists borrowed and still borrow from Eastern Religions and Philosophy). Eastern Philosophy often deals with many of the, religious paradigms, cosmologies, ethics, epistemologies and social and political philosophies of the eastern globe, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Jainism, Zen, African Philosophy (although often this is now its own category), etc. and all the caveats within. Again, these are all immensely basic definitions, but it does provide the reader with a gist. As I mentioned, there are other subfields, but they often overlap with these mentioned. 

    Continuing on, Soccio also seems to think that it is helpful for the newcomer to philosophy to think of the philosophical thinkers of our past as “archetypes” which is a name that he borrows from the Swiss Psychiatrist (but also Philosopher, Anthropologist and Mystic) Carl Gustav Jung. This is a prime example of how philosophy, religion/theology, and psychology all go together. (This makes me smile, because I once had a Western Psychologist essentially communicate a message to me within a highly relevant situation, that my input—as a philosopher—had no merit in psychological human affairs). Soccio writes, 

In the ancient world, the wise person was known as the sage; in parts of Asia, a bodhisattva, yogi, or guru; in parts of Africa, a witch doctor; among Native Americans and the nomadic tribes of Asia, a shaman. In the Bible, the prophets were people of wisdom. In many cultures, the “grandmother” or “grandfather’ or some other elder represents the basic image of the wise person. In the West, the wise person is often [in sexist nature] depicted as a male, but not always. In cartoons, the “wise man” is often caricatured as an oddball or a hermit wearing a robe of some sort, maybe carrying a staff, and sporting a long white beard. Why do you suppose that is? Because even cartoonists tap into this nearly universal image—and we recognize it. […] This kind of basic image is sometimes referred to as an archetype. According to psychologist C. G. Jung (1875-1961), an archetype is an image that has been shared by the whole human race from the earliest times. In its more traditional sense, an archetype represents our conception of the essence of a certain kind of person. An archetype is a fundamental, original model of some type: mother, warrior, trickster, cynic, saint, pessimist, optimist, atheist, rationalist, idealist, and so on. A philosophical archetype is a philosopher who expresses an original or influential point of view in a way that significantly affects subsequent philosophers and nonphilosophers. (5)

As far as Carl Jung’s archetypes, there was never an extremely clear picture to what it actually was, and what it looked like in application. This is partially because there could (in theory) be an infinite amount of archetypes. But also because it’s difficult to empirically track, as it is at least in part a metaphysical assertion, even if it can be empirically observed also, in part. As modern Jungian scholar, Murray Stein defines archetypes, he writes that they are, “An innate potential pattern of imagination, thought, or behavior that can be found among human being in all times and places.” (Stein, Jung’s Map of the Soul, 233). If I could provide an educated guess, I’d say Soccio has created the ‘philosophical archetype’ as a concept to aid students in their understanding of philosophy and its different figures—but perhaps there is more to it for him. Nevertheless it does provide a model if you will, and the different places that thinkers and philosophers can be placed on the spectrum. To provide some examples of these philosophical archetypes, Soccio exemplifies some of the archetypes that we can observe in human affairs, but also within the history of philosophy: 

One philosophical archetype is the skeptic […]. Skeptics believe that any claim to knowledge must be personally verified by their own sensory experience. They want to see, touch, taste, or measure everything. The New Testament contains an excellent example of this archetype in the person of “Doubting” Thomas, the disciple who would not believe that Jesus had risen from the grave until he carefully examined Jesus’ wounds for himself. […] Another philosophical archetype is the utilitarian […]. Utilitarians believe that pain is inherently bad, that pleasure is inherently good, and that all creatures strive to be as happy as possible. Thus, utilitarians argue that our private and communal behavior should always maximize pleasure and minimize pain. You might recognize their famous formula: Always act to produce the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number of people. You probably also recognize utilitarian thinking in all sorts of “majority rules” reasoning. (7)

I think you get the idea here. 

    But, to also help the general public have a better understanding of it, especially for philosophy as the truth-seeking venture, Soccio continues, 

Even with its cultural limits and biases, philosophy is perhaps the most open of all subjects. Its primary goals are clarity of expression and thought, and its chief components are reason, insight, contemplation and experience. No question or point of view is off-limits. […] The best philosophers—no matter what their personal beliefs—defer to the most compelling arguments regardless of their origins. Such important philosophers as Plato, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Stuart Mill, Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzche, and Martin Heidegger, to name but a few, radically questioned and revised their own thinking over the course of their lives, reacting to what they saw as more compelling evidence. (9)

I also agree with Soccio here. I think some of them, did not revise their views enough, but that’s always easier said than done, especially when a person in modern day reflects back and picks apart a philosopher’s thinking which in many ways, was bound to their era and understanding of life (even if other elements transcended its time). And if/when they do, that’s in some ways a testament to their status as philosophers, and to the stature of their status.

     The following to be shortly discussed has been briefly mentioned by Soccio, but we are about to spend more time on it. There is another important element of importance worth mentioning within philosophy, and this is extremely relevant to philosophy as I practice it, but also according to Soccio, and this is the relationship between “wisdom” and “knowledge.” If you recall, wisdom was introduced earlier when I brought into conversation (via Soccio) the sages, the yogis, the gurus, the African witchdoctors, the Native American shamans, the biblical prophets, or YHWH (Jesus) himself, the “grandmothers,” the “grandfathers,” etc. and so forth, that have existed throughout history, and come to be known in our minds as archetypal figures. Well, Soccio states, 

The chief goal of wisdom is a fundamental understanding of reality as it relates to living a good life. At its core wisdom is reasonable and practical, focusing on the true circumstances and character of each individual. We might say then, that wisdom is good judgement about complex situations. Consequently, wisdom involves reflection, insight, a capacity to learn from experience, and some plausible conception of the human condition.  Unlike forms of knowledge that require formal education and specialized intelligence, wisdom has been associated with experience in a way that theoretical and intellectual knowledge has not. This may be why wisdom is so often associated with the elders of a tribe or clan. Yet, clearly, age alone cannot guarantee wisdom, nor can intelligence. Wisdom has also been associated with personal virtue far more than knowledge has. (12)

I haven’t seen every philosopher make this distinction, but it is widely seen in my areas of focus. For example, there is often a distinction between wisdom and knowledge made within the Black, African, and Black Womanist/Feminist writers. Some examples include, lay philosopher Malcolm X, philosophical theologian Martin Luther King Jr., philosopher and systematic theologian James H. Cone,  and Black Womanist/Feminist philosopher Patricia Collins (to name a few moderns). This distinction between wisdom and knowledge is also found within most religions, the Christian tradition (the mystics), including the eastern philosophical traditions (Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, etc.). Soccio continues, 

Philosophers generally agree that knowledge is some form of true belief. Questions then arise as to how to distinguish true belief from mistaken belief; and, as you might expect, different philosophers give different answers involving the roles of reason, perception, experience, intuition, and social agreement in this process. Some philosophers go so far as to deny the possibility of knowledge entirely. […] Philosophers also distinguish between theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge involves the accurate compilation and assessment of factual and systematic information and relationships. Practical knowledge consists of the skills needed to do things like play the piano, use the band saw, remove a tumor, or bake a cake. (12-13)

The first half of this, is diving into philosophy’s subfield “epistemology.” I’m not going to say much about that right now, because I’ll talk about it shortly. But for the latter half, this is pretty standard within philosophy. We see this dialectical with in ethics as well, where there is metaethics (an analysis of the language and meaning of terms like justice, goodness, love), and then applied ethics where the application of ethics takes place in concrete examples of specificity. Soccio continues, 

Depending on their nature, evaluating knowledge claims involves logical argumentation, scientific experiments and predictions, or the demonstration of some skillful performance. It would seem, then, that to know X means, first, that X actually is true; second, that I believe X to be true; and third, that I can justify or establish my belief in X by providing adequate evidence.  […] Knowledge claims raise some interesting and thorny questions. For example, Is a strong personal feeling adequate evidence? How much proof is enough? According to whose criteria? Philosophers demand that we provide reasons to justify our knowledge claims. (13)

Interestingly enough, there is a common notion that science and philosophy are at odds with each other. (There is all kinds of nuance to this, but what I’m thinking about particularly is condescending attitudes towards philosophy from scientists). That is a view that I have read repeatedly, (and even heard from the mouths’ of scientists with my own ears) which is, 1.) immensely oversimplified in that it catches only slivers of what is actually going on, and 2.) it’s a tremendous oversimplification that shows the gross underbelly of “educated” thought here, and that is simply erroneous. With that said, scientists don’t have a good reputation for adequately dealing with philosophy or understanding it (see Peter Godfrey-Smith’s “Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science). One exception to this (among scientists’s dealing with philosophy), is Karl Popper (which a group of scientists in the scientific community have heralded, a bit arbitrarily, but heralded nonetheless). We will come back to him here in a bit. But for now, I would like to also point out that Soccio doesn’t (explicitly) acknowledge it here, but this investigation into knowledge that you see, particularly in the latter half of the above paragraph is delving into the subfield of philosophy that we mentioned earlier, “Epistemology.” Soccio continues, 

In contrast to knowledge, belief refers to the subjective mental acceptance that a claim is true. Beliefs—unlike knowledge—need not be true. Because beliefs are subjective mental states, it is possible to be firmly convinced that a belief is correct when it is not. On the other hand, sometimes our beliefs are true, but we’re unable to offer adequate evidence for them. […] Although beliefs can be either true or false, technically speaking, “false knowledge” is impossible [at least in how Soccio has defined it]. The very idea is self-contradictory. For the most part, our everyday language reflects an understanding of this important distinction. We rarely say “I had pretty good reasons to think that peach pits boost intelligence, but I’ve since learned that I was mistaken.” […] Some beliefs are more reasonable than others, and there’s a big difference between informed belief and mere belief. Mere belief refers to a conviction that something is true for which the only evidence is the conviction itself. If that sounds circular, it’s because it is. Mere belief validates itself—or tries to. Most philosophers and scientists believed that truth cannot be reduced to merely believing something. For example, you do not have cancer just because you believe that you do. The best way to distinguish reliable beliefs from problematic ones is to subject important ideas to careful scrutiny. To a certain extent, we can, and must, do this for ourselves. (13)

I mentioned that I would come back to Karl Popper earlier, and this is where I will. First, I just want to make it clear that not everyone accepts what Soccio is writing about knowledge. Some say that knowledge is justified true belief. Others say that’s too strict. Some say that it is not strict enough. Other philosophers like Karl Popper don’t believe (pun-intended) in belief at all. The mind for him, ought to be more like a pendulum always leaning in the direction of new evidence, and not stagnant, or attached to dogmatic “belief” in some immovable manner. Although, I’d argue the majority of philosophers do accept some level of belief. 

    Lastly, I think one of the most important elements of a true philosopher is how they deal with ignorance, and this is another thing that separates them from other mistaken views of philosophy. Soccio has an excellent section on this.

Because we are all limited by our experiences, abilities, and preferences, we cannot just rely on our untested thinking. We need to consider others’ ideas, and we need to subject our beliefs to the scrutiny of others. In the realm of philosophy, we would be wise to take advantage of those thinkers and ideas that have stood the test of time and significance. (Of course, we do not want to accept the arguments of philosophers just because they are considered great or important.) (13)

Too often, I find people outside of philosophy: scientists, religionists, lawyers, the general working class, and unfortunately many in education thinking that they are either above philosophy, or that philosophy isn’t relevant to their profession or personhood. Unfortunately either thought process is a type of close-mindedness. Soccio writes,

Even though we need to think for ourselves, impulsively or defensively rejecting important philosophical arguments before we have really thought about them is foolish—arrogant. It is foolish because we cannot really know what value there is in a position if we do not give it a fair hearing. It is arrogant because summarily rejecting (or mocking) ideas that have influenced careful thinkers from the past and present implies that without any background knowledge we know more than philosophers, scientists, and theologians who have devoted years of study to these issues. […] More subtly, we can shut off challenging questions by prejudging them, by being inattentive and bored when they come up, or by mocking other points of view without investigating them. When we do this, we put ourselves in the position of holding on to a belief regardless of the facts. In such a state, we become indifferent to the possibility of error or enlightenment. Willed ignorance is the name of this close-minded attitude, and it is as opposite from the love of wisdom as any attitude I can think of. […] For most of us, ignorance is not a serious option. As thoughtful people, our choices are not between philosophical indifference and philosophical inquiry but between a life lived consciously and fully or a life that just happens. Because of its fragility and finiteness, life is just too important not to philosophize about—and we know it. (13-14)

In Conclusion:

    After spending a lot of time dealing with what philosophy is not, hopefully I have cleared up some of the confusion in negatively objecting to all of these posited social understandings. Furthermore, I positively offered a definitional understanding of philosophy as a history, discipline, or academic field of study, as defined by Soccio to further clarify matters, and in replacement of the former poorer understandings. Hopefully, after reading this, we are now more equipped in understanding and identifying what philosophy as a discipline actually is, and hopefully, this article has been inspirational and compels us to follow Soccio’s instruction in doing some personal introspection, and make sure we have the willingness to engage with philosophy, opposed to being close-minded in our approach to it. If you did not understand philosophy, I hope that I have facilitated in your understanding, at least a little bit further in the right direction, considering the field of philosophy is vast, and complex. Also, if you read this article and feel called-out, welcome to the club, and welcome to philosophy. :)

 

                                              Works Cited:

Bartdorf, Emily, et al. Living Pay Check To Pay Check. Forbes.com. https://www.forbes.com/advisor/banking/living-paycheck-to-paycheck-statistics-2024/.

Soccio, Douglas J. Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2016.

Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York: The New Press, 2020.

Murray Stein, Jung’s Map of the Soul: An Introduction on Jungian Psychology. Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2010.

Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago Illinois: The University of Chicago Press/ Chicago and London, 2003.